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ABSTRACT
Blockchains have gotten popular in recent times, owing to the security,
anonymity, and lack of any third-party involvement. Blockchains essentially are record
keeping tools that record any transactions between involved parties. One of the key
aspects of handling and navigating of any autonomous traffic on the streets, is secured
and simple means of communication. This thesis explores distribution of minimum
resources between multiple autonomous agents, by settling conflicts using events of
random nature. The thesis focusses on two specific events, tossing of a coin and the game
of rock, paper, and scissors (RPS). An improvement on the traditional game of RPS is
further suggested, called rock, paper, scissors, and hammer (RPSH). And then seamless
communication interface to enable secure interaction is setup using blockchains with
smart contracts. A new method of information exchange called Sealed Envelope
Exchange is proposed to eliminate any involvement of third-party agents in the
monitoring of conflict resolution. A scenario of assigning the sole remaining parking spot
in a filled parking space, between two vehicles is simulated and then the conflict is
resolved in a fair manner without involving a third-party agent. This is achieved by
playing a fair game of RPSH by using blockchains and simulating cross chain interaction
to ensure that any messages and transactions during the game are secured.
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CHAPTER ONE
BLOCKCHAINS
Blockchains were first introduced, in 2008, by Satoshi Nakamato in his paper
introducing bitcoins [1]. The advent of blockchain has been compared to the rise of
internet and it is being referred to as the next big technological innovation. It is a secured
digital ledger for economic book-keeping. It can securely record any information that can
be expressed as code [2]. Blockchains enables decentralized exchange of information
using secured keys, that allows authorization of transactions, by all involved parties.
Blockchain has found its use in various applications from finance, real estate to
healthcare. Operations that earlier needed a third party to regulate and secure transactions
are not needed anymore.

The blocks serve as information while the chain serves as the database [3]. This
database is usually a public ledger that is updated as new blocks are added to it and the
chain grows. This database can also be a private ledger, thereby making the blockchain
private. Such a blockchain has limited access and only few people or groups can make
transactions (create blocks) on the chain.

Blocks in a blockchain serve as a form of database. These can be used to store any
form of data. Ideally, they are used to save information about successful transactions.
Once a transaction is successfully verified, the blocks record the information, and a new
block is formed. The first block or the building block of the chain is called the genesis
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block. Along with the string stored, the blocks also store the hash of the previous block
and their own hash.

Figure 1.1: Hash Encryption

“\x00\xf9\x81}\t*\xef#\xb5\x97\x95d\xb4^R\xa3\xa4EP\x1c\xc5\xb1\xa3\xd4\xd
9\xce\xe2@5Py5” This string of various hexadecimal characters is just the encrypted
version of the string “Hansel and Gretel”, while
“\x010\xbb\xf01<Q\x93F\x87\xec\xce\xc5I\x84\x1fk\xd8\xf1n\x9c\xe3\xa7\xd20>\x90)\
xe2a” is the encrypted string for “Hansl and Gretel”. A hash is the encrypted version of a
string as shown in Figure 1.1. A hash function converts a given string into a series of
hexadecimal characters. This helps make the chain tamper proof. There are certain
requirements for the selection of a hash function.
1. The hash function should convert strings of any given length into an encrypted
string of fixed length.
2. No two strings should ever result in the same output.
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3. There should be no way of converting an encrypted string back into the
original string.
4. A small change in the input string should result in a major difference in the
output string [4].

Even though no two strings should ever result in the same output. There are
infinite possibilities for the input string but only a finite number of possibilities for the
output string, owing to the fixed size limitation. In rare cases, this can result in two
strings having the same output. This is known as collision. The probability of this can be
reduced by choosing a good hash function [4].

Figure 1.2: Hash [5]
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The encryption ability of a hash function serves a very important application in
securing block chains. When any transaction is carried out and the information is stored
inside a block. The block generates a hash from this data. Since, the hash of a string
cannot be the same as another string. Anytime an attacker attempts to modify data in a
block, the hash of the block changes. As shown in figure 1.2, every block records the
time, transaction, and the hash of the previous block along with its own. So, if the
attacker were to make any changes to block n, it would change the hash of the block, so
when the next block attempts to verify the authenticity of the transaction by comparing
the hash of the previous block with the modified hash, it results in an error. This makes
the chain tamper proof.

Hash functions are Trapdoor One-Way functions (TOWF),
𝑓𝑓: 𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑦𝑦 where,

𝑓𝑓 is a unidirectional function. So, it is easy to compute 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑦𝑦, but nearly impossible

to obtain 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑓𝑓 −1 (𝑦𝑦) for given 𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑌𝑌. So, a hash function, ℎ can be described as [6],
ℎ: 𝑀𝑀 → {0,1}1 , with ℎ(𝑚𝑚) = 𝑚𝑚
�

Owing to the numerous advantages that blockchains have to offer, they have been
used for several different applications. The most popular being cryptocurrencies. But
apart from those, they are also used for record keeping, building smart contracts,
monitoring supply chain, data backup, transportation networks and IOT.
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1.1 Blockchain Network
A blockchain network is a set of agents/nodes working on the same blockchain,
where each node holds copies of the chain. All these nodes form a peer to peer network.
Each node is assigned a private key and a public key. The sender authenticates the
transaction using their private key and their peers can access this using the public key. An
invalid transaction is discarded. Valid transactions are authenticated using and added to
the chain. Each block on the chain is verified by the hash of the previous block.

Figure 1.3: Peer to Peer Transaction

1.2 Proof of Work
Let us say Mack, went to a coffee shop and paid for his coffee with bitcoins.
Mack returns home accesses the chain, removes the transaction, and later shares this
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modified chain with his peers. This would redeposit all the coins back in his wallet. This
is called double spending, wherein one of the users modify previous transactions or delete
them and add them back to the chain. This way a user can use the same coins multiple
times. This makes it extremely important that all the nodes share the same copy of the
chain [7]. Just as it is important for an orchestra to work together, to produce a beautiful
melody, it is important for all the nodes to be in sync.

To avoid this all the nodes creating blocks are required to provide a cryptographic
proof. There are several ways of doing this, but the most popular method is by adding a
nonce. A nonce is a small integer value, that along with other hash parameters reduces
the hash value than the current target value [7]. The resulting hash value starts with a
certain number of zeroes and there is no way to predict what the correct value will be.
The nodes try running different computations on their validated blocks. This method
utilizes the computing power as a factor for each node, to assess validity of the blocks.
This can increase the block interval for a chain. The block interval is the frequency with
which content is written to a blockchain. A difficult computation will increase the block
interval, which will consequently result in fewer blocks being written on the chain and
vice versa [7].
1.3 Smart Contracts
Any business of conventional commerce involves signing contracts. Assume that
there are two parties A and B. A signs the contract first and sends it to B for being signed.
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A is at a disadvantage here since there is no guarantee that B might be fair. The only way
to make the process fair is to either have them sign the contract face to face or do it
remotely but in the presence of a fair third party [8]. Such a situation demands that smart
contracts be fairer and more convenient.

Kim et al. [8] discuss the two different approaches on solving this issue. The first
one is using procedural programming. The contract formed lays out all the tasks in order
and the protocols. It becomes a unit of the organization that governs the contact and the
all the tasks are performed. The second one is that the contract itself becomes the
contractor. This can be enforced either by any of the parties involved in the transaction or
a fairer third party. This party is assumed to be efficient and impartial. These contracts
can lay out the obligations and how they are to be enforced without following up. They
do not track the progress, rather they just ensure that all requirements are met.

1.4 Private Blockchains
Public blockchains are not suitable for some commercial applications, owing to
the universal public access to the chain. Another type of blockchain, with a closed
environment that only a few known nodes can access, can help solve the problem. This is
known as a private blockchain. Consensus algorithms and smart contracts help make
private blockchains more efficient than public blockchain [9]. Private blockchains are
faster, safer, and more efficient as compared to public blockchains.
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1.5 Cross Chain Communication
Over the years several different blockchains have been developed. All of these
work independently, without any cooperative operation. There is a lack of
communication among these chains, which hinders any development that could result
with resource sharing within multiple different chains [10]. Within the current ecosystem,
new blockchains are created to meet any emerging needs. This results in fragments of
contained spaces which can hinder the growth of the industries deploying these chains.
Another disadvantage is that with each chain, industries might need to make certain trade
off, compromises with security to leverage higher efficiency or vice versa [11]. This can
create certain limitations for individual chains. Essentially it is highly impractical for
blockchain to serve as a ‘one size fits all’ solution, where a single chain supports all
transactions and performs all desired operations globally [12].
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Figure 1.4 Cross Chain Communication [13]

As shown in Figure 1.4 Cross chain communication is the means for
interoperability between independent chains. Chains can interact with one another by
means of resource exchange between independent and unrelated blockchains. This can
Cross chain communication facilitates direct transfer between different blockchains. This
is especially useful when dealing with multiple private blockchains, as it provides a
means of transfer between willing agents with different ledgers. It helps link independent
chains [13].
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Cross chain communication has several advantages to offer. There is no need for a
trusted third party or escrow. Verified nodes can transfer assets over secured channels.
Cryptocurrencies can be exchanged freely. Chains can access common or other chain’s
database. This can help in developing smart contracts or trigger any other transfer [10].
Headers and events from multiple chains can be verified and consensus algorithms can be
developed for multi-chain operations. Chains compromising on certain features can
leverage them from other chains thereby supporting cross chain development [11].

There are several different methods of implementing cross chain communication.
Even though such a type of interaction can be tricky with complex protocols and the
technology is still under development, there are ways this can be implemented. One of
the easiest ways is to have a trusted third party like an escrow to facilitate all asset
transfers. The party can be one that both the users on different chains trust. The
intermediary can verify all transactions and activities before the final transfer is
initialized. This method is more centralized in nature and compromises on any
advantages, decentralization might offer to its users. Using sidechains that support
multiple blockchains but are not dependent on any of the main chain can help avoid
centralization. Any assets to be transferred can be held in the side chain until the
transaction is completed. Another method is using hash locking. Hash locking uses a
particular hash value. Both parties need to verify the hash value in stipulated time, as
defined by the protocols to complete a transfer successfully. This method increases
security but compromises on transaction throughput by increasing required computation.
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This has limited applications. A more feasible method that the thesis focusses on is called
the distributed private key control. This method uses a distributed private key exchange.
Assets are locked on transfer and can only be accessed by private keys specific to all
involved parties. This method helps maintain decentralization along with reducing
computations. This also does not require any kind of modifications to the chain and
works irrespective of the nature of the blockchains involved [13].

Figure 1.5 Smart Contracts in Cross Chain Communication

Smart Contracts are an essential part of any blockchain peer to peer network.
They help ensure all transactions are regulated as per requirements. Figure 1.5 illustrates
the implementation of smart contracts in blockchain communication. The first blockchain
initiates the transaction, but the coins are not yet released to the client (Blockchain 2). As
discussed earlier, smart contracts act as an overseer to make sure all tasks are
accomplished between the involved parties. Once this is verified, only then are the funds
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released. These also make sure that the tasks are accomplished successfully in the
stipulated time, or else the transaction fails.

To quote Aleks Larsen, a senior associate of the firm Blockchain capital, “Strong
interoperability could shield users from the trade-offs that blockchains make and allow
them to interchangeably leverage the optimizations of different consensus mechanisms
and virtual machines, in many cases off-loading tasks that are better accomplished on
other chains and letting each focus on its core competencies. If we end up in a world of
many blockchains, interoperability can make them more useful, user-friendly, efficient
and scalable.” [14].
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CHAPTER TWO
IoT and Blockchain
IoT stands for Internet of Things, it is a rapidly emerging technology that plays a
very important role in connecting multiple devices so they can interact, be queried, and
controlled directly by its users. It connects physical devices so they can be operated
remotely. It is a very innovative way for humans, organizations, and other entities to
interact with each other seamlessly. IoT is dependent on various platforms and devices,
that process a lot of information to keep the network running. A critical requirement of
the IoT is that the devices must be connected to the internet and be interconnected to each
other [15]. This can put a toll on cost, energy, and device lifetime. IoT applications are
used in fields ranging from healthcare, education, and resource management, for
example, using RFID tags for inventory management [16] or using a network connecting
the alarm system to the coffee machine [17].

IoT networks generate a large amount of data. All the devices collect data from
their surroundings and use it to plan their tasks. As a result, devices record every bit of
information regarding person’s habits, schedule, and preferences etc. Current IoT models
work on a centralized client-server model, this leaves the network highly susceptible to
data theft. With growing IoT technology it is important to give users complete authority
of their data [15].
Autonomous vehicles use networks to interact with each other. Internetwork
communication between fleets of cars can help coordinate, while data collected during
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operation supports further AI development. These vehicles require extensive data to
operate effectively. Sensors like cameras, GPS, wheel encoders and LiDar are used for
3D mapping of the environment [18]. Thus, IoT is also a big part of autonomous vehicles,
that keep it connected for smooth operation.

IoT introduces a wide range of risks and security threats. An extended attack on
even a single node can compromise the complete system. Many nodes are deployed for
specific function such as cloud storage, computational capacity or saving energy. These
nodes sometimes do not possess enough capabilities to protect themselves from an
outside attack. Centralized service providers can further steal data from all the
interconnected devices [19]. Current security protocols rely on brute force measures for
cutting any access, an outside attacker might have once the system is infected. Such
methods are hardly an option in mission critical systems such as manufacturing, delivery,
health and especially V2V (Vehicle to Vehicle communication) [20].

Blockchains have the privacy feature built into their design. A decentralized
approach can help users gain complete authority over their data. A peer to peer network is
a more ideal choice in securing users data and providing them with more freedom.
Furthermore, a peer to peer consensus algorithm can support securing any exchange
between the interconnected devices on the network, with a transaction log monitoring
each device’s activity. Ali et. al. (2017) [19] described this environment as a ‘trust-less’
one, which has more accountability built into it.
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Blockchains can be used to maintain an immutable data access and operations log
for all IoT operations. Each device can be assigned a private blockchain or a side chain to
a root blockchain, with each chain being responsible for maintaining records for all
sensor feeds and data exchange. The root blockchain forms a larger, decentralized private
network. Only authorized devices are allowed access to this network and the root chain is
responsible for logging any access requests for the user’s data. This can further create an
economy of personal data, where willing users can choose to sell their data to any
interested parties [19].

Blockchains bring decentralized computing and storage, along with
authentication, digital presence, and access control for users both in the public and
business domain, that can help develop current IoT technology [21]. Smart contracts on
blockchains can enable supporting more secure and flexible information exchange
protocols. Smart contracts support interoperability of heterogeneous IoT smart contracts.
Message exchange is treated similar to financial transactions and smart contracts can be
leveraged to tracing any transaction between the interconnected devices and between the
user and the devices. This can enable autonomous operation between all devices, while
securing the user against data theft. Communication with devices or networks outside the
network, i.e. with other chains or smart contracts can be blocked off. A smart contract is
like a script with a unique address. The script is a reference to transactions that trigger
data exchanges within the devices, that are part of the network. Since, all devices own the
same copy of the contract, tampering is virtually impossible [22].
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Various IoT security measures that can help secure the data channels and keep
any unwanted visitors out, have been tested over time. Encrypting the data to avoid any
tampering can help maintain confidentiality. Encryption is performed at the sender end
while it is decrypted when received by the desired receiver. Only authorized users should
be allowed access to the data. It is important that surrounding unauthorized nodes do not
access any of the sensitive data. Receiver should authenticate correct receipt of package
throughout the network. Certification helps confirm the identity of both entities that are
communicating with each other. Access control can help block illegal access by any
person, object, or machine. Certificate technology with identity identification can ensure
no leak [17].

Current security measures for IoT make the model highly centralized. Using
blockchain technology can help move the model towards a more decentralized approach.
Using blockchain as a main archive helps instantly track and verify data. Since, the
system is regularly updated with the latest block there is no scope for a point of failure.
Once created, blockchains are immutable and incorruptible. Any attempted modification
is flagged which nullifies any data tampering attacks [20]. Transactions are executed and
stored via census algorithms. However, since public blockchains lack scalability that can
lead to problems with an IoT infrastructure. Jiang et. al. (2019) [23] talk about a multi
chain model that implements cross chain protocols with smart contracts and consensus
algorithm for efficient and secure IoT data management. The model is a decentralized
access model which optimizes device management and converts data into cash flow.
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Access control protocols are put in place for privacy protection. They experiment proved
that such a model was more suitable for managing IoT devices. It proved to be more
efficient than a general blockchain structure.

Data gathered by IoT devices usually contain a lot of private information about
the users and various interactions between the user and the system. Most IoT systems are
highly centralized and have single points of failure that can hinder scalability. Existing
methods of securing these systems and providing privacy protection are under third party
entities. These entities also control all or most data storage servers and can adopt
surveillance systems to misuse any of the personal data. Moreover, the network
architecture faces a lot of threats. The entire network can be paralyzed, or a DOS attack
can result in a massive failure. Users barely have any control over their data. Also, there
is no accountability by third parties on network failures or data thefts. Lack of traceability
follows, and users must place their blind faith in the system. As more and more devices
are added centralized servers will lose their efficiency and it will become tougher to grow
the IoT network, as these servers won’t be able to handle the increasing amount of end to
end communication between all these devices [24].

The shift towards integrating blockchain can improve the network making it
stronger against any attacks. It will remove all single points of failures. New servers will
not require third party entities to handle the network traffic anymore. Malicious software
updates can be avoided and all the users in the network can verify transfer of data. All
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end to end communications can be authenticated and traceability can be maintained since
all transactions are recorded onto a public ledger that is shared among all the users. This
is further validated by the users, resulting in a tamper free environment. Users can
monetize services provided and all transactions can be easily secured [24].

Cybersecurity is one of the most challenging barriers for IoT development. IoT
devices are physical entities that are isolated and are subject to tampering. Also, these are
connected to other devices and therefore it becomes difficult to protect individual devices
and also secure all end to end communications. Also, IoT devices have limited
computational power, so it is nearly impossible to deploy any sophisticated security
protocols. Such a network with several interconnected devices, that are constantly
communicating and sending messages throughout the entire network, over the internet, is
highly susceptible to attacks. To secure such a network, two important steps that need to
be taken are that, countermeasures need to be setup that are designed specific to each
device and more computational power needs to be reserved for security purposes [24].

Data is collected from IoT users without any explicit consent. This deprives users
of any control over when and where their data is shared or sold. The concern with IoT
networks is not just data that but also data handling. Along with data collection another
aspect is data storage, the volume of data collected every second from all these devices
demands massive cloud storage. Without IoT platforms that can guarantee both
scalability and privacy protection into their design, it is nearly impossible to develop
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these networks. Blockchain networks store a large amount of data over blockchain peers,
which can offer data integrity to the users and a resilient network [24].

With growing networks and more complex security protocols and massive data
storage support, there is also a growing concern of increasing maintenance costs. Cloud
based infrastructure not only adds to the high maintenance costs but also communication
costs. But blockchains use dedicated servers that are significantly cheaper. Moreover,
since users can be monetized for using their computational and storage abilities, these
prove to be a big step in handing control to the users themselves. Users can further gain
cryptocurrency in exchange for their personal data [24].

Once a smart contract is executed, no intermediary can stop it from running or
block it. Transactions play an important role in supporting these operations. If a code is
sent, an input parameter can be set depending on the end point. For, a null account the
transaction can trigger setting up a new smart contract, that will then be converted for
interchain operability and executed. This can help when there are many devices or as
newer devices are added to the network and thus blockchain can support smoother
scalability and secure addition of new devices [25].

There are numerous advantages of such a model, and it can help grow several
industries. Insurance companies for example can utilize this to calculate premiums and
keep records of all their clients more secure. It can also help establish a network that can
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support payment from the clients directly to the insurance provider and aid in rendering
services from the providers directly to the clients. The model can rid the agents of any
third- party services that might be required. Smart contracts can help keep all processes
compliant to legal standards and clients can be protected from any fraud. Companies can
migrate to using cryptocurrencies [24]. Any industry requiring trading via third party
service providers can rely on this model for ubiquitous service provision. Client
confidentiality can be maintained along with assurance of secure payments and no data
thefts. Companies can have an oversight over all trades via the ledger. A greater
advantage would be to the supply chain industry. With unique identifiers, warehouses and
distributors can have a wider control over all decisions regarding material distribution.
Real time authentication of requests and subsequent provisions of service can be assured.
Multi resource handling, of a variety of products with several clients can be easily
handled.

Not all devices can engage in the network and keep records or support all of the
operations on the network due to resource constraints. So, all devices need to be assigned
specific duties. So, some devices can be assigned to keep contributing to the blockchain
while others can support block validation and support decentralized consensus. Figure 3.1
highlights the different ways devices can assist in supporting the blockchain.
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Figure 2.1: Integration of IoT devices and Blockchain [24]
Devices can act as gateways, while blockchain supports all the
communication between them. Devices act as end points. This is shown in the top left
diagram in figure 2.1. This makes the devices accountable for all the traffic and not all
communication needs to be stored. Smart contracts in place can assist in supporting
transactions and securing all communication. Such an infrastructure requires more
computational power. But the network is not purely decentralized as all communication
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initiated by the device, first passes through the blockchain. In the second approach, as
shown in the top right diagram in figure 2.1, the devices issue transactions to the chain.
All the devices support encryption and the blockchain simply supports the devices in
their operations. The architecture can only be supported by complex devices and will
require increased computation for every device involved. For events where devices are
already secure and only require the blockchain for record keeping, the system as
illustrated in the bottom right diagram of figure 2.1 is more suited. All the devices can
initiate transactions and can interact without using the chain. The devices choose what
data needs to be recorded and accordingly communicate with the chain. Such an
architecture is more desired with devices that communicate constantly and are reliable.
The architecture illustrated in the bottom right diagram of figure 2.1 is more of an
extension to the previous architecture. Apart from just controlling the communication
between devices, here the devices also control any or all transactions initiated and only
some of the transactions are passed through the blockchain [24].

Consider a case where devices fail during operation in a network. Blockchains via smart
contract can support failure monitoring of devices. This ensures devices are performing
their assigned tasks. This can also be used for data recovery from failed devices or to
setup alerts. As more devices are added to the network, the number of nodes increases,
and it becomes easier to find devices that can support any failed nodes. Such a node can
support scaling and it can improve as more devices are added to the system [26].
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Cryptography can ensure data security and privacy protection in an IoT
environment. There are several methods of achieving this. Almost all of them not only
protect the user’s data but also their identities. This helps provide a completely secure
framework. Data collection is based on the hash function used. Time taken for encryption
is also determined by the size of the group. With a large number of devices encryption
time increases [27].
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CHAPTER THREE
Efficient Resource Allocation
Sometimes multiple operations are needed to be carried out using limited
resources. These operations can be seen in day to day life. The problem can be described
as Distribution of indivisible finite objects among a finite number of agents or processes.
This can be seen in examples like distribution of labor, project management, budget
allocation or even wireless network handling. In all such cases, enhancing the
performance of the system is highly desired but the complexity involve with optimally
allocating resources can get really challenging [28].

Deterministic algorithms, linear programming, dynamic programming and,
heuristic algorithms have been used in the past to solve such problems. But in many
cases, especially with non-deterministic problems or cases where not much problem
specific information is available. Also, cases where given activities are indivisible. In all
such events the computation becomes incredibly tough. A new approach to solving such
problems as described by Ergin (2002) [29], is a priority model. Ergin talks about
resource allocation based on priority. A finite number of objects are to be distributed and
the agents have a fixed preference and every agent receives at least one object. A pareto
distribution is used to develop the model and assignments are distributed based on their
superiority.
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Solving problems based on priority can make the computation simple but it only
works if the structure is acyclical. Once objects become scarce, the model becomes
restrictive and less efficient. Also, the model assumes that all the agents receive at least
one object each. In scenarios with n+1 agents and only n objects, where n𝜖𝜖N, the pareto
efficiency for the model drops. I have focused on solving this problem with a much
simpler and realistic approach.

Figure 3.1: Parking Spot Allocation

Imagine the scenario illustrated in figure 3.1 with two autonomous agents. Both
need access to a parking spot. Both agents are close to a parking lot with two entry and
exit points. But there is only one spot remaining. The agents now must mutually come to
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a unanimous and fair agreement on who gets the spot. Both the agents have an equal right
of way and are equidistant from the parking spot. There is no further information
available about the two agents. We do not know their place of origin, their destination, or
their fuel status. A unanimous decision is important to arrive at the required outcome.
The two agents share no performance objectives other than the desire to park at the said
spot. Assuming both agents are fair, deciding here is particularly tough because both
agent’s preferences are categorically opposed. There is no mutually advantageous
outcome to this situation [30]. The error costs associated with the given situation are
dependent on whether the agents come to a unanimous decision. If the agents base their
own decisions on individual benefits, they can end up crashing into each other. This
creates a conflict between their self and group interests [31]. Arriving at a decision can
help them proceed as a cohesive entity in a dynamic environment.
3.1 Coin Toss
With time, there have been several optimization algorithms that have been
developed for solving complex problems. All these algorithms consider numerous factors
that may directly or indirectly affect the parties involved. Each of these have their own
advantages and disadvantages. At the end, all of the algorithms, with their diverse
approach share a common goal of achieving an optimized or fair decision. Decision
making is a complex topic, even when concerned with everyday life. Even though there
are optimal ways of choosing among alternatives, in carefully controlled well-structured
settings. People do not rely on principles of optimal performance. It is easier to use
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heuristic methods over algorithmic strategies, even though these strategies generate
deviations from optimal judgements [32].

Accumulating information to choose between several options is desirable, but it is
not always feasible. The process itself can be tedious and time consuming. Sometimes, it
can also complicate a situation and result in the inability to respond effectively to a
situation due to an over analytical approach or an excess of available information. This is
known as analysis paralysis. In such situations, a random decision-making alternative can
help decide. Such an alternative does not require any arguments or information. Such
methods help make quick, straight forward, and fair decisions.

A coin toss is an event of tossing a fair coin in the air to determine which side it
lands on. A coin toss gives both sides an equal chance, it is efficient and quick. This
method does not have any effect on the outcome as well. Moreover, no actions taken by
the involved parties can influence the final decision as well. This method makes it easier
to decide when none of the options to a situation have an advantage on the others and are
weighed equally [33]. A random method of decision making can also ensure choosing
between options with equal merit.

Even though events or practices that are random in nature can be of advantage in
certain decision-making situations, not all of them are feasible or can be applied in every
situation. For example, an event like a coin toss requires a third party to ensure that the
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whole process of flipping the coin is fair. The involved parties further need to agree on
definitions of a fair coin and a fair method of flipping. For situations without a mediator
or a third party, it can get difficult to keep the complete process fair and structured. So,
such situations require tools that carry the same advantages of a random event, but also
need to be simple enough to be carried out in the presence of only those parties that are
affected by the outcome and deter such parties from trying to use unfair means to
influence the outcome to their advantage.

3.2 Rock, Paper and Scissors

Figure 3.2: Rock, Paper and, Scissors
Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) is a fundamental non-cooperative game. It is a basic
model that can help the decision-making process in non-deterministic and complex
environments. The game has three candidates, Rock (R), Paper (P) and Scissors (S). Each
player must make either an R, P or S gesture. The gestures are ideally to be made
simultaneously, to avoid any unfair advantage that the player with a late response might
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gain from knowing the opponents move. The rules to the game, as illustrated in figure 3.2
are simple, R beats S, S beats P and P beats R. Choosing the same gesture i.e. R vs R, P
vs P or S vs S results in a draw. Thus, the game can have a total of two outcomes, a
player wins while the other loses or both draw [34]. Since, deviating from once strategy
has little or no effect to the outcome, assuming the other player does not deviate, game
theory predicts that the choices by either players will be completely randomized and there
is no chance of exploitation, also referred to as the Nash equilibrium strategy [35].
Irrespective of what one player picks, there will always be some strategy that guarantees
that the opponent wins.

There have been several instances in history where RPS has supported scenarios
which required a fair decision-making model. It helped settle disputes and make fair and
unanimous decisions. The game does not require the involvement of a third party and that
also helps keep the process limited to the invested agents. In 2006, a federal judge
ordered the defendant and the opposing counsel to settle a trivial debate over a
deposition, by playing a game of RPS. In 2005, the CEO of a Japanese company decided
to auction of his assets worth $12-16 million. The decision as to which firm would be
responsible for carrying out the auction, was decided by a game of RPS between two
firms, he believed to be good but was unable to pick one from the other. Several more
such events through time have proved to be RPS a practical approach to settling disputes
[36].

29

Several variations to RPS have been developed over the years. Each of these
make the process more random, by adding in more candidates and thereby lowering the
probability of selection for each. This makes the game more challenging. Two popular
variations are, Rock, Paper, Scissors, Fire, Water (RPSFW) and Rock, Paper, Scissors,
Lizard, Spock (RPSLS).
The rules for the RPSFW combination are,
•

Paper beats Rock

•

Scissors beats Paper

•

Water beats Fire

•

Water loses to everything other than fire and

•

Fire wins against everything but water.
The rules for the RPSLS combination are,

•

Spock beats Scissors and Rock

•

Lizard and paper beat Spock

•

Rock and Scissors beat lizard. [36]

Each of these renditions look simple and promising, one disadvantage that they all
share is the possibility of drawing. The possibility of drawing between the agents, makes
the situation complicated and time consuming. Thereby making all of these unreliable.
Running a simulation where two players played a fair game of RPS 500 times. The
results of the simulation, as shown in Figure 2.3, were that player 1 won 45% of the
games, while player 2 won 20% of the games. Unfortunately, both of the players tied for
about 35% of the games or 175 games.
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Figure 3.3: Simulation Results
3.3 Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer
Owing to the issue of the possibility of the game drawing and the transaction
coming to a halt, a new rendition of the game Rock, Paper and Scissors, called Rock,
Paper, Scissors and Hammer (RPSH), as shown in figure 3.4 is proposed [37]. The game
has only two options, 1 and 0, to pick from which makes it easier for the players. The
player that picks the first option is called the regular player and all the choices for the
player are referred to as regular choices i.e. regular 1 and regular 0. While every choice
that the opponent picks are labeled as alternate choices i.e. alternat 1 and alternate 0. The
rules are simple,
•

Alternate 0 beats regular 1

•

Regular 0 beats alternate 0

•

Alternate 1 beats regular 0
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•

Regular 1 beats Alternate 1

Figure 3.4: Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer

The game can only be played between two players, but it offers the advantage that
the game never ties. This makes the process simple as each game ends in only two
possibilities, either player 1 wins or player 2 wins.

Each player’s set of possible options is denoted by, 𝐴𝐴 = {0, 1} and ∆𝐴𝐴 =

{(𝑝𝑝(0), 𝑝𝑝(1) ∈ 𝑅𝑅3 | 𝑝𝑝(0) > 0, 𝑝𝑝(1) > 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝(0) + 𝑝𝑝(1) = 1} denotes the set of

probability distributions on A. Assuming player i and player j are two players competing
such that, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1,2} and 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗. Figure 3.5 shows Player i’s payoff matrix.
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Figure 3.5: Player i's payoff matrix
Player i's payoff is represented by,
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 )) = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ) ∈ ∆(𝐴𝐴) 𝑥𝑥 ∆(𝐴𝐴) =

(1)

∑(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ,𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)∈𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 )𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 (𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 )𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 )

Now, it is known that a pair of mixed strategies (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ) is a mixed Nash

equilibrium, if either of the player’s strategy is the best response to the opponent’s strategy
1 1

1 1

1 1

[58]. Consider the strategy profile (( , ), ( , )). If 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = ( , ), then,
1 1

𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , ( , )) =
2 2

1 1

1
2

2 2

𝑥𝑥 (−1) +

1
2

2 2

2 2

𝑥𝑥 (1) = 0 ∀ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝐴

1 1

Thus, the strategy (( , ), ( , )) is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
2 2

2 2
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(2)

1 1

1 1

Suppose player i plays any other strategy different from (( , ), ( , )).
2 2

1 1

𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (0), 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (1)) ≠ ( , ).
2 2

2 2

(3)

1

Without loss of generality, let us assume, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (0) ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (1), that implies, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (0) > .
2

So,

𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 1) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (0) − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (1)

(4)

1 + 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 1) = 2𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (0) > 0

(6)

(5)

𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (0) + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (1) = 1

It is known that if 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝜖 ∆(𝐴𝐴) is a best response to 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 𝜖𝜖 ∆(𝐴𝐴) and player i plays 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝜖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 such

that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ) > 0, then 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � ≥ 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 �𝑎𝑎́𝚤𝚤 , 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � ∀ 𝑎𝑎́𝚤𝚤 ∈ 𝐴𝐴 [38]. This means that 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 (1) =
0 ∀ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 is the best response to 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 .

Also,

𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 �0, 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � = 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 (0) − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 (1) implying 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 (0) > 0

(7)

1 1

So, we can conclude that any other strategy except ( , ), is not a best response to any
2 2

mixed strategy. This proves that there can be no mixed Nash equilibrium in any other
1 1

strategy except for ( , ).
2 2

There are two pure strategies in the RPSH game. (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) denotes the generic social

state of the population, with players using a strategy of either 0 or 1. At time t assuming,

34

player 𝑛𝑛0 (𝑡𝑡) played 0, while player 𝑛𝑛1 (𝑡𝑡) played 1. Now, 𝑛𝑛0 (𝑡𝑡) + 𝑛𝑛1 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝑁𝑁. Thus, 𝑥𝑥 =
𝑛𝑛0 (𝑡𝑡)
𝑁𝑁

and 𝑦𝑦 =

𝑛𝑛1 (𝑡𝑡)
𝑁𝑁

, where 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑦𝑦 = 1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0, 𝑦𝑦 ≥ 0. The total number of different

social states for a population of size N is expressed as 𝑁𝑁 =

(𝑁𝑁+1)(𝑁𝑁+2)
2

. So, for N=2, total

number of social states are 6 [39]. The evolutionary trajectory for the state space system

for RPSH, would form a triangle in 2-dimensional space with center point of the triangle
1 1

being the Nash equilibrium point or ( , ).
2 2

Figure 3.6: Social State Space of RPSH

3.4 IoT Devices and RPSH
Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer is a non-cooperative simple game, that helps
arrive at a decision between options that hold equal merit, every time. One important
aspect of playing the game is that the opponents need to reveal their gesture or their
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choice at the same time. This is an easy condition to fulfil when all involved parties are
physically present at the same location or are visually connected, so that they may be able
to present their choice without knowing any of the opponent’s choices, thereby playing a
fair match.

Users connected over an IoT network face a disadvantage when attempting to use
such a process for making a decision. Such a situation requires a different approach when
playing the game. Certain requirements to this are,
•

The players should be able to share their selection without any interference from
unrelated third parties

•

None of the players should be able to change their selection once shared

•

None of the players should have access to what the opponent has selected without
having selected themselves

•

The players should be able to stay anonymous if they choose so

This can be achieved by integrating a blockchain network using a smart contract to
govern the transaction between the users.

Using a two key encryption method such as RSA, the user can encrypt their
selection and share it with their opponent. Once the first player shares their encrypted
selection and the public key with the opponent, a smart contract triggers a second
transaction, allowing the second player to pick a selection in a stipulated time frame,
encrypt it and further share it with the first player, along with the public key. This is

36

stored in a block on the chain, the transaction is only approved each time, when the user
shares their selection along with the key. The second player is only allotted a stipulated
time which ensures that they do not attempt any unfair means of breaking the encryption
or using any other unfair means to influence the outcome. Once the transactions are
successfully completed, both the players share their private keys, this can help decrypt
each of their selections. Such an exchange ensures that all the requirements are met, and
the players arrive at a fair decision [40].
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CHAPTER FOUR
Illustration of Practical Situations
Large virtual networks rely on the internet for providing several services. This
puts all the users at a risk. Authorization and verification of service providers is
uncertain. There is no surety of whether the person you are dealing with has any
malicious intent or not [41]. Corporate companies have had a long history of cheating for
their own gains. Over the years several car companies have been found to mess with the
car’s onboard computers to indicate wrongful compliance with laws. Since 1970, several
car companies have been found to using defeat devices, that can manipulate a car’s
horsepower or mileage, by letting dirtier gas exhaust than set standards. A University of
Denver professor, Donald Stedman, from the Chemistry department once said that the
economics of the automobile industry make it profitable for car manufacturers to cheat.
To maintain lower costs and high product standards, car manufacturers have been found
to use methods that have gone against global standards for environment protection [42].
A study estimated that Volkswagen’s use of defeat devices has led to an estimated 36.7
million kg of excess nitrous oxide gasses into the atmosphere, between 2009-2015 alone
[43]. This makes it necessary to have a model which cannot be accessed by any third
party. This also makes it necessary to have a decision-making model, involving
autonomous cars to be independent of any interference by the agents themselves. As car
manufacturers have been known to reprogram the automobile’s ECU for their gains, any
trust model that can be influenced by the agents themselves cannot be implemented and
any computational trust has to be built free from any influence from any of the agents.
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Computational trust is dependent on abstract notions of human trust. This means
any models need to be built considering lack of reliable information and need to be
uncontrolled by any involved agents. It is nearly impossible to predict how robust a
system is with change in environment and how well it behaves under various
assumptions. A model of trust between unknown agents only works when protocols are
rigorously defined [44].
The model described above can be used for any situation that requires users to
take quick optimized decisions. This can prove especially valuable to users connected via
an IoT network. Several instances where at autonomous devices need to work together to
achieve a common goal or make decisions without the hassle of complex optimization
algorithms. Using blockchains to set the communication protocols for such devices can
make them more secure, while reducing any delays in operation caused due to any
interference from outside agents.

4.1 Parking Spot
Smart parking has become an issue over the years, with the increase in number of
automobiles and urban population. It has both economic and strategic advantages.
Parking has also become a big source of revenue for many cities. With smarter parking
services, drivers can conserve resources spent, looking for a spot. A smart parking
ecosystem can also solve driver conflicts. With many drivers looking for a space, a
competition occurs, and this results in cumulative parking conflicts [45]. It is important to
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not just advertise parking availability to all nearby drivers but also let them attempt to
solve any rising conflicts to streamline the process.

Considering the parking scenario as shown in figure 3.1, a private cross chain
communication model is proposed. There are two agents (cars) that need to access a
parking spot. Both enter a parking lot with only one spot available. The model uses a two
key system where both are assigned their private and public keys. Data is converted into
cash flow, the ledger updates as messages are sent across two chains with the cars acting
as nodes. The two agents begin by forming the genesis block. The architecture for the
model involves a threaded system. The exchange of information forms a block. The
ledger forms the stack. The model uses RSA encryption with a 2048 bit key.

Figure 4.1: Message Passing
Threads are sets of commands that need to be executed in order, this ensures all
necessary tasks are being performed by the system. Figure 4.2 shows the working of the
process flow. All the transactions are recorded onto the ledger. The agents move onto the

40

next transaction once all agents confirm receipt of response from the previous step. Thus,
the smart contract stays enforceable without any governing third parties. This is made
possible by integrating the use of message passing and thread management.

Figure 4.2: Communication Model
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Figure 4.3: Timeline
The two agents play a fair game of RPSH. Appendix 1 highlights the algorithm of
how the game is implemented and played by the two agents using blockchain. Each of
them takes turns in making transactions. Figure 4.3 illustrates the complete process. This
begins with the first agent choosing an option. The choice is encrypted using the keys and
sent to the opponent. Now, the second agent knows that the first agent has decided, but
there is no way of knowing what it is, unless he uses the private key to decrypt the data.
The second agent now has a stipulated time to make his decision. Once the agent
chooses, another transaction takes place where the agent shares his decision, and the key
with the first agent. Both the agents share their private keys. This helps them know each
other moves simultaneously. The transaction is verified along with the outcome of the
game. The winner gets the spot. Figure 4.3 illustrates the timeline for the corresponding
events. The timeline is divided into 6 events. The first is generate keys, where the private
and public keys for the data encryption are generated. This is followed by the transactions
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by each agent. Finally, the ledger is updated, and the final decision is made, based on the
choices.

Figure 4.4: Transactions between the agents.
The complete process as shown in figure 4.5 is divided into two transactions. The
first transaction is when the first agent sends the selection to the second agent. This leads
to creation of the first block for both agents. The second transaction is when the second
agent shares its selection with the first agent and the second block is created. This results
in a small but private chain for each agent.
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Figure 4.5: Block summary for the model
As discussed earlier the hash of a block is what makes the chain tamper
proof. Each block is connected via the hash. As seen in figure 4.5, the blocks and the
ledger ultimately, records the decision that each agent makes. The decisions are recorded
as cash flow and each transaction is only valid when each agent makes their choice in the
stipulated time.

One of the interesting features of the model are message and key passing. The
data is encrypted using the RSA algorithm. It uses a two-key method, a public and a
private key, as illustrated in figure 4.6. The decision taken by each agent is encrypted and
until the opposing agent makes its decision, the private key to decrypt the decisions is not
shared. RSA is the first algorithm that can be used for encryption and to generate digital
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signatures. The algorithm is secure because it is nearly impossible to decompose large
numbers [46].

Figure 4.6: RSA Encryption

Figure 4.7: Transactions and Block Creation
Cross chain communication plays a very important role in the complete operation.
Considering each event as a discrete one, figure 4.9 illustrates all the points where the
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two chains interact. Figure 4.8 is a time plot showing the formation of blocks as the
transactions are successfully authorized. Each transaction is divided into discrete events
and plotted versus time. The dots act as markers for each event. Comparing the two plots
you will notice how the first block is created somewhere between 0.0070 and 0.0075s
when the first transaction occurs between the two agents and there’s a marker at the exact
same time on the event plot. This is when the first agent shares its decision with the
second agent. It takes agent 2 about 0.025 seconds to respond back. The plot represents a
private chain making transactions seamlessly with limited number of blocks. Such a
model works similar to a public blockchain but with lesser number of blocks, it requires
lesser computational power and easier consensus algorithms, thereby showing the
effectiveness of private blockchains.

Figure 4.8: Event Plot
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Figure 4.9: Threat Assessment
Since, there is always the possibility of having malicious agents, or agents that
don’t want to play fair. A threat assessment was done to highlight the security features of
the model. Appendix 2 highlights the different vulnerabilities that were assessed and
added into the simulation to ensure the communication was secure. Figure 4.9 is a box
plot that illustrates the different attacks, that were tested. The second agent is given a
stipulated amount of time to pick an option, if the agent fails to do so, the transaction
fails. This discourages the agent from using any unfair means to break the encryption. It
further ensures that the operation is completed quickly. As seen in the plot the first
transaction where the agent takes longer than 0.6s to pick a choice, the transaction fails.
Every blockchain transaction is only authenticated when the digital signatures for the
participants are verified. In case the signatures are incorrect the transaction fails. Event 2
and Event 3 represent transaction failure due to the two agents failing to use the correct
signatures to verify the final transaction. The forking in blockchain is the problem when a
miner or a user intentionally introduces a long chain such that the current blockchain has
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two paths to take, in an order to access the blockchain’s data. The fourth event is where a
couple dubious blocks are introduced as an attempt to replace the good blocks on the
chain with malicious blocks. These were flagged and the transaction fails. The final event
is the model with no attacks on the chain and a fair consensus is achieved resulting in a
successful transaction.
It is important to note that blockchain is an integral part of the model. Using the
privacy features of blockchain, the need for a third party is eliminated, Figures 4.10 and
4.11 show the process flow of using a third party vs not involving a third party. The
communication model without using blockchain can open up the situation to several
vulnerabilities,
•

Cars can attempt to sabotage and take control of the other car’s onboard
computer.

•

Record keeping becomes tedious and must be integrated separately. Also, it
becomes hard to keep a record of the interaction in real time.

•

A centralized model would require higher computational power and a fair third
party to make the decisions.

•

Transparency can be achieved since all parties involved in the chain can keep a
track of all the interactions.

•

All data recorded is immutable and none of it can be altered, which is the most
important advantage of using a blockchain.
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Figure 4.10: Process involving a third party

Figure 4.11: Process eliminating a third party
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4.2 Forklifts Passing Through a Passage

Figure 4.12: Forklifts Passing Through a Passage (adapted from [47])
In a factory setup, there are multiple forklifts running all day. These forklifts carry
a lot of raw material and tools from the warehouse to the manufacturing lines. They are
an indispensable part of all logistic operations. They can be used to carry up to 8000 lbs.
of loads. These create increased efficiencies and play an important functional role in the
production process [48]. There are about 540,000 operators working in 300 different
industries in the United States [49].
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With a huge number of forklifts working around the country, it becomes
important to plan out optimal route strategies for all these forklifts working round the
clock, for all scales of operation. It is also detrimental to establish secure communication
lines so these lifts can interact with each other as necessary and carry out their daily
assignments. With the advent of autonomous vehicles and robots, more of these industrial
trucks and forklifts may be made autonomous as well.

Figure 4.13: Conflicting Paths [50]
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Figure 4.14: Shared Path [51]

Consider a scenario with two forklifts wanting to access parts in the same aisle as
shown in figure 4.12. Both are headed towards the aisle and need to pick their respective
parts up and get it at different locations, so the production lines can stay stocked and on
schedule. None of them can afford any and both want to take the optimal path to conserve
energy and time. This is also true when two forklifts need to make a decision of passing
through a door or have conflicting routes as shown in figures 4.13 and 4.14. In such
situations it becomes necessary to establish communication between them, so both are
aware where they are heading and avoid any mishaps. Even if both get there and avoid
any accidents, they might reach a standstill and then need to negotiate on the path to be
taken, this will result in delays and reduced efficiencies.

Establishing a network to connect these forklifts over a blockchain, where they
can communicate securely and make decisions on path planning can help save a lot of
time and increase efficiency. The forklifts use the model described above and can decide
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on who takes the optimal path and who takes the alternative path, or they can decide on
who enters in first and which one follows. This can help take this quick and simple
decision without having to waste any resources.

Moreover, since all such transactions are recorded onto a ledger by the blocks,
they can be later accessed to check for how many times were their conflicts between
different forklifts on their path. This data can help plan future path planning operation or
plan the time of order for such forklifts better. Thus, the model doesn’t just help avoid
conflicts in the present but the data can be used to plan future operations in a much safer
and efficient possible manner, without having to dedicate a lot of resources to the cause.

4.3 Vehicles Switching Lanes

Figure 4.15: Switching Lanes [52]
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A more everyday application for such a decision-making model would be
autonomous vehicles achieving lane change maneuvers safely as illustrated in figure
4.15. For various lane change maneuvers, especially on an interstate when lanes merge, it
becomes important to take quick decisions, that not only account for change in your path
but others as well. In such a system coordination is extremely vital. Blockchain can
facilitate secure communication between all these vehicles. The ledger can be used for
insurance purposes in case of accidents, as all the interactions recorded are done in real
time and are immutable. Good and quick communication can not only save from any
damage, but it can also conserve resources and save energy by avoiding activities like
sudden change in speed. In such situations the model could prove to be an effective tool.

4.4 Robotics and Commercial Autonomous Vehicles

Figure 4.16: Swarm Robotics [53]
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Figure 4.17: Connected Vehicles Environment at an Intersection [54]
Swarm robotics deals with multiple robots in a connected environment dedicated
to achieving a common goal. Figure 4.16 illustrates a situation where the robots are trying
to work together to realize a common goal of navigating the maze. Using IoT these can
stay connected and coordinate, blockchain can protect them from deviating from their
goal or any outside attacks. The ledger that records all these interactions can later be
analyzed for any optimizations in path or in control. Figure 4.17 illustrates a similar
situation with connected autonomous vehicles at an intersection. Communication is key
in all such situations and can lead to optimized trajectory planning and resource
distribution. The model can essentially help make communication more secure along with
solving any conflicts.
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Autonomous vehicles and robots use numerous sensors to gather data about their
environment. These also have the ability of collecting personal data of users around,
including the location and everyday movement data. Such a situation holds multiple
threats. First, this can be used as a surveillance system by private companies and second
ethical decision making. Autonomous agents can further increase any bounds set for their
own development. Autonomous vehicles operate in the public domain and thus have a
high chance of invading the privacy of others around. Moreover, such an open network is
susceptible to attacks, for data thefts or other malicious intent. Companies might also use
this to their own advantages. Insurance companies might track license plate number to
check for speeding and increase insurance rates. They could log physical movements of
every person in the environment and be used to stalk them. All these take place in a
public setting and thus are at a higher risk of data loss. Autonomous cars can turn into
new privacy invasion tools. There is no accountability to these companies of these
devices. Nor is there any traceability of any of the data being collected. In such a
situation, users lose any control over their data. Also, such an open network is highly
susceptible to any attacks [18].
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4.5 Competing Agents

Figure 4.18: Parallel Machines [55]
Several situations demand agents to compete for common processing resources.
For example, in a parallel machine environment as shown in figure 4.18. In such cases it
is important, to achieve the best solution for one or all agents, while making sure the
agents left do not have to accept solutions at high costs. Such a situation can arise in
several application environments, where negotiations are needed. Machine Language
(ML) has been used to solve a large number of such situations including but not limited
to, devising schedules for agents with unacceptable task timings, supply chain problems,
scheduling trains to share railway tracks and sharing of satellite communication
resources. It is important to serve all the different needs or objects that different agents
might have. Some agents might accept delays, while others might accept data loss, it is
important to keep that in mind [56]. But not all agents have enough computational power
to support ML algorithms and these require a simpler and computationally less invasive
methods. Moreover, some situations cannot support alternative scheduling and there are
limited resources that agents must pick from. In such cases it is simpler to have a noncooperative game theory approach in settling all arguments.
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4.6 Conflict Resolution in a Connected Vehicle Environment
Intersections are one of the major contributors to traffic congestion. A conflict
zone is an intersection where different vehicles access the crossing at the same time. The
model can be implemented to provide efficient ways for crossing vehicles and to
cooperate with other vehicles approaching the conflict zones. Instead of a centralized
controller, vehicles can themselves negotiate for time and space allotments. Output
trajectories can be planned accordingly, and energy can be conserved based on optimal
trajectory allocation. Vehicles can decide whether to yield or pass and thereby avoid
collision [57].

Existing conflict resolution algorithms are mainly centralized, with emphasis on
control of traffic using traffic lights. Other systems with extensive communication
models still have conflicts between agents with same strategies. A ‘yield’ and ‘go’ model
can still experience deadlocks in local decisions. Such methods are inefficient as they
may require vehicles to stop even in no conflict zones. For, multiple vehicles at a 4/2 way
intersection, it becomes a challenge to determine who must go first. A distributed conflict
resolution mechanism should indeed be feasible, it should not be computationally
intensive and should have a passing order for any set of vehicles passing through a
conflict zone. Decisions should be made in real time and no two vehicles should either be
allowed to go or yield at the same time. The priority should always be on finding a
feasible solution [58].
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The proposed algorithm is suitable for real time control. Only nearby agents need
to participate and resolve the problem together, this makes it easier for them to
communicate, instead of having a lot of agents competing for communication resources.
Also, agents on the downstream can take charge and later decide with the passing vehicle
on who slows down and relay this information to succeeding vehicles. Such an ecosystem
is not computationally intensive and thus will have lesser delays and time lags. A fair
outcome can be desired and none of the agents or car manufacturers can use any unfair
means to influence the final decision.

4.7 Intelligent Docking System

It is important to extend any smart parking mechanisms to public transportation
systems. This has several advantages in an urban setting. In rail networks different types
of vehicles can share the same settings. But on road bus systems need to be more robust.
Congestions imply longer wait times, decrease in quality of service and waste of
resources. Driverless settings can employ various sensors ranging from Lidars to
Magnetic sensors, for placement and detection [59]. The algorithm presented can be
employed for quicker scheduling and route picking services. Docking of a fleet of such
vehicles can be easier scheduled with internal conflict resolution between the vehicles.
This can be extended to a fleet of commercial trucks as well.
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4.8 Fog Computing and Sharing of Computational Resources

Figure 4.19: Fog Computing [60]
Fog computing is an extension of cloud computing with several advantages. It
provides low latency and has a widespread distribution. It can support scalability and can
support varied platforms. It can support a variety of critical IoT services. Fog computing
provides computational and storage services to several end devices. This also requires
cooperation models between users and providers that can provide services to clients.
With more utilities and agencies switch to fog computing there will also be a need to
assign and share resources within all providers. It can support real time analytics, for
connected vehicle system or smart city applications. Fog computing can also support an
IoT network with several devices and a bidirectional flow of information and resources.
A blockchain supported IoT setting can be further integrated with fog computing, for real
time interaction, data validation and support cloud data storage systems [61].
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CHAPTER FIVE
Simulation
The following simulation has been developed for the parking scenario. It is an
application developed in python to highlight and visualize all the interactions taking place
between the two cars (Refer to Appendix 4). The chapter focusses on the algorithm for
key passing and the visual simulation of RPSH. It is important to highlight the
importance of IoT in the model. Various sensors can help establish trust between the two
agents. IoT has several advantages to offer,
•

Sensors ensure and authenticate the physical presence of a car and that it’s not just
a bot that is trying to hold the space for some other car as illustrated in figure 5.1.

•

The internet offers a way to establish virtual communication.

•

Bigger cars can attempt to bully any smaller cars. Cars can be used to block the
other car and hold the space. A universal virtual presence with IoT can ensure no
bullying or any agent with more resources does not take advantage of the
situation.
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Figure 5.1: Human Generated Bot Mimicking a Car.
5.1 Key passing
One important aspect of the communication between the agents is message
passing. An encrypted message along with the public key. As this key is not enough to
decrypt the message, it assures the opponent that the decision has been taken.
function key_passing
publicexponent = 65537, keysize=2048
publickey = rsa.generatekey(publicexponent, keysize, backend)
encoding and serialization to generate signature
sign(message, privatekey) //see appendix 1 for sign function
Transaction_input.append(publickey, message)
if Transaction.verify() == True //see appendix 1 for verify function
return True

62

else
return False

One of the applications of the described model is resolving a parking issue
between two autonomous agents. The following sections comprise of a visualization of
the model. The agents, ‘Car 1’ and ‘Car 2’ come to a unanimous decision on deciding
who gets a parking spot using the Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer (RPSH) decision
making game and later also the Rock, Paper, Scissors.
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5.2 RPSH

Figure 5.2: RPSH Simulation

Figure 5.2 (a) shows the beginning screen for the simulation applet. The applet
was designed using python. Once you press the start button, the agents begin to
communicate via a private blockchain network. Figure 5.2 (b) shows the agents begin
initializing, a genesis block is created and each of them sends a message saying ‘hey”.
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Next, The agent prompts the user to pick and option as shown in Figure 5.2 (c). Selecting
it triggers the message passing algorithm. Appendix 3 discusses about the RSA algorithm
that has been used to develop the required signatures and keys. RSA has also been used
to encrypt the data and ensure that it is impossible to decrypt any data.

Figure 5.2 (d) shows a visual confirmation of the selection. This is extremely
important in case of humans trying to interact with the machines. Vehicles must be
capable of conveying information to humans interacting with the vehicle, regarding it’s
intention and it’s performance [61]. Figure 5.2 (e) illustrates the completion of the first
transaction. The selection is encrypted and exchanged. This prompts the second agent to
begin making their selection as shown in figure 5.2 (f).
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Figure 5.3: RPSH Simulation – 2

Figure 5.3 (b) shows the final transaction, where private keys are exchanged. The
cars decrypt each other’s selections and arrive on a mutual outcome as shown in figure
5.3 (e).
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion and Future Work
The parking simulation shown demonstrates the effectiveness of the model. Using
Rock, Paper, Scissors and Hammer, the drawbacks of the traditional game of Rock, Paper
and Scissors have been countered. It highlights the versatility of the blockchain
technology and how it can prove to be an important tool in governing autonomous agents,
especially in a vulnerable environment. Companies have had a long-standing history of
bending the rules. An environment with agents having the computational ability to take
their own decisions, individuals with malicious intent can always try breaking into and
sabotaging the environment for their own personal gains. An IoT environment with a
network governed by blockchain can help build computational trust and bring
accountability. Having an immutable blockchain ledger, with the ability to record all
interactions in real time, helps determine faults in the system and develop solutions to
required problems. The threat assessment shows several events where agents with
malicious intent fail, highlighting the effectiveness of smart contracts. The method of
Sealed Envelope Exchange gives such agents the opportunity to interact with unknown
agents. Event plots highlight the activity of the agents in real time.

The future potential for this model is not just limited to the ability to setup
communication between agents using blockchains, but also integrating sensors and
making use of bio mimic logic to identify agents before they even begin interacting.
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Exploring the ability to assign keys that act as digital identities, that can be used to
interact over the blockchain. Such identifiers can create a safer and more trusting
environment. Physical identification over digital keys can also help root out bots or
computers mimicking actual vehicles. A fixed key assigned to vehicles can help develop
strong virtual presences similar to a physical presence. It can help bring accountability to
agents that would deliberately sabotage or attempt to delay communication in order to
forcibly acquire the parking spot. For agents that attempt to intentionally ignore any
competing agents and forcibly acquire spots, a digital identity can be recorded onto the
ledger indicating proof of established communication or proof of no response. This can
bring accountability to all agents that do not want to be fair. Digital identities can also
indicate emergency vehicles and handicap vehicles and special permissions can be
extended to such vehicles.

A digital presence can aid in building a universal presence for agents irrespective
of the type of car, so conflicts between cars with varying horsepower or agents with
varying resources can still be resolved in a fair manner, without any unfair advantages.
Using more advanced sensor systems can help keep better records of any illegal or unfair
ways that other agents might use to influence the decision. Records from the ledger
indicating frequency of conflicts and traffic frequency can help plan better traffic control
and optimal path strategies for autonomous vehicles.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
RPSH model for blockchain
//Initialize RPSH state variables as [0,0,0,0]
//Variables are updated as rounds progress and the agents make their selection
Keys:
Generate Private keys and Public Keys using RSA
Public_exponent=65537
Keysize=2048
//Keys are serialized, and bytes are returned by function
Block:
Initialize data and hash variables as 0
Data = Transaction_input
Previousblock = previous_block_data
//If this is the first block, there is no previous block and the data will be updated
//as NULL
Previous_block_hash == Current_Block_Hash
//If verified block is created, else ledger is updated with an error
Compute_Hash = sha256() //python function generates hash
//Hash for current block is updated. Hash for previous block is verified
//If verified, hash is returned
//Function returns True after valid block creation, else false.
Sign(Message, Private Key):
Message is taken from user and encoded in utf-8 as bytes.
//Message encrypted using private keys withing a set maximum length
//Hashes.SHA256() //hash object returned from SHA256 funtion
Transaction(Block):
Data received from input is updated as Transaction_input
//Valid function checks for the correct Hash and keys
If Transaction.valid()
return True
else
return False
Verification(Message, Sign, Public Key):
Load serialized Public Key along with message.
If Signature Invalid
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Elseif

print(“Error”)
return False
PreviousBlockHash == Hash
SelfPublicKey == LoadedPublicKey
Return True

RPSH(Message, Private_Key):
Load Serialized Private Key along with message
If Transaction.verify() = False
Return False
else
Decrypt Message with Private Key
C1 = AgentSelfChoice //The AgentSelfChoice saves the choice selection
//by the agent themselves
C2 = Message
if C1 > C2:
print("C1")
Win = 1
return Win
else:
Win = 2
print("Win")
return Win
//Win variable indicated which of the two agents have won
UpdateLedger(Win):
If Win == 1
Load txt.dat file in write mode
Print to file(“Car 1 gets the spot”)
Close txt.dat
If Win == 2
Load txt.dat file in write mode
Print to file(“Car 2 gets the spot”)
Close txt.dat
Block.add(Win, Transaction)
If Block.verify(Win, sign, public key) == True
Block count updated.
Valid Block Created Successfully.
else

70

return False
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Appendix 2
Threat Assessment
Refer to figure 4.10. The threat assessment figure shows the following four threats
that were blocked.
1. Delayed response by the second agent
2. Incorrect signature is used by the first agent
3. Incorrect signature is used by the second agent
4. Incorrect/Dubious blocks are added to the chain
Each agent is presented with two choices, 0 or 1. Once the first agent has decided,
the selection is encrypted and sent to the second agent. Now, the second agent has 6s to
make their selection and make the transaction. If the agent fails to do so, the transaction
returns a Null message, and the block creation is failed.
function Threat1
Message.sign(PrivateKey)
Transaction1 = Transaction()
Transaction2 = Transaction()
Transaction1_input.append(PublicKey1, Message)
Transaction1_output.append(PublicKey2, Message)
Block.AddTransaction(Transaction2)
t = time.time()
while(t<6)
Transaction2_output.append(PublicKey1, Message)
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Transaction2.verify(Message, Signature, PublicKey1)
return True
return False
If the signatures are not verified a block cannot be authenticated as the message is
not from whom it was intended to be.
function verify
load_public_key = serialization.load_pem_PublicKey(pem, Password, backend)
if (load_public_key == PublicKey)
return True
else
return False
function Threat2
Transaction_output.append(PublicKey2, Message)
Transaction.verify(Message, Signature, PublicKey2)
// The function returns false and the Transaction is not verified.
The final threat was the creation of dubious blocks. This was verified by checking
the hash of the block with the previous block. Since the hashes did not match, the block
was not added, and the transaction was declined. The SHA256 function is used to
generate all hashes. All key generation and serialization functions were used from an
open source python directory [63].
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Appendix 3
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
RSA is one of the oldest public and private key generation algorithms, widely
used in data encryption. The algorithm uses two large prime as exponents for encryption
and decryption. The algorithm is shown in figure A3.1 [64].

Figure A3.1: RSA Algorithm [64]

74

Appendix 4

from graphic import*
import pygame, time, random
from cryptography import serialization, default_backend, hashes
win = graphicwin(“simulation”, 1100, 700)
win.setbackground(color_rgb(255,255,255))
//privatekeys ex1 and ex2 are generated for encryption of selection
Generate():
private_key_ex_1 = rsa.generate_private_key(
public_exponent=65537,
key_size=2048,
backend=default_backend()
)
private_key_ex_2 = rsa.generate_private_key(
public_exponent=65537,
key_size=2048,
backend=default_backend()
)
try:

public_key.verify(
sig,
message,
padding.PSS(
mgf=padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()),
salt_length=padding.PSS.MAX_LENGTH
),
hashes.SHA256()
)
return True
except InvalidSignature:
return False
except:
print("Error")

75

return False
Sign(Private_Key):
sign = private_key.sign(
message,
padding.PSS(
mgf=padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()),
salt_length=padding.PSS.MAX_LENGTH
),
hashes.SHA256()
)
return sign
//Define points for each car location
//button def
p1 = Point(100, 50)
btn = Button(win, p1, 100, 30, "Start")
btn.setFill(color_rgb(200,200,225))
btn.setBorderColor(color_rgb(255,255,255))
btn.setTextColor(color_rgb(0,0,0))
btn.activate()
btn.draw(win)
//Automated control for RPSH
RPSH1 = random.randrange(0,1)
RPSH2 = random.randrange(0,1)
Transaction.input(public_key_1, 1)
Transaction.output(public_key_2, 1)
//Encrypting message with RSA
sign(message, private_key1)
sign(message, private_key2)
//Exchange of options
Transaction.input(public_key_1, message)
Transaction.output(public_key_2, message)
Transaction.sign(private_key_1)
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Transaction.input(public_key_2, message)
Transaction.output(public_key_1, message)
Transaction.sign(private_key_2)
//Exchange of keys
Transaction.input(public_key_1, private_key_ex_1)
Transaction.output(public_key_2, private_key_ex_2)
Transaction.sign(private_key1)
//Decryption_RSA_algorithm
//Compare the two options
*Refer to Appendix one for RSPH algorithm
if Win == 1:
t = Text(Point(550,150),"Car 1 gets the parking space")
t.draw(win)
else:
t = Text(Point(550,150),"Car 2 gets the parking space")
t.draw(win)
#EXIT

time.sleep(10)
t = Text(Point(550,350),"Please Close The Window To Exit")
window = Rectangle(Point(50,50),Point(1050,650))
window.setFill(color_rgb(255,255,255))
window.draw(win)
t.draw(win)
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